Recent Trends in the Criminal Law by unknown
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 65 | Issue 1 Article 5
1974
Recent Trends in the Criminal Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Recent Trends in the Criminal Law, 65 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 87 (1974)
TMH JOuRNAL op CRIwAL LAW & CRMNOL.OGY
Copyright a 1974 by Northwestern University School of Law
RECENT TRENDS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
DIscOvERY
Federal and state courts continue to define and
clarify the scope of discovery in criminal cases. The
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
refined its previous decision' on pre-trial discovery
and the District of Columbia court of appeals
would not extend discovery to allow the govern-
ment to obtain the defense investigator's report.
Two state courts, Florida and New York, dealt
with the discovery of police records. A third state
court, Michigan, ruled on a request for discovery
of the prosecution's dossier on prospective jurors.
In United Statesv. Quinn, 364 F. Supp. 432 (N.D.
Ga. 1973), the court modified the procedures it
previously had outlined for pretrial discovery.
The court held that the test of whether disclosure
is required is whether the information "is mate-
rially favorable to the defendant," not whether
the information '"night be considered helpful." In
United States v. Eley,2 this court had required the
government to search its files for any information
that ' might be helpful" to the defense and to turn
over to the court for in camera determination any
of the material it contended was not "materially
favorable." Many defendants were unclear as to
the standard and felt they were entitled to court-
ordered discovery of anything that "might be
helpful." The court, in Quinn, explained that the
"might be helpful" test was a threshold test only
and not the final standard to be applied in deter-
mining whether the defendant had a right to the
information requested. In clarifying the test, the
court stated that the standard for court-ordered
discovery in compliance with Brady v. Maryland,'
has always been whether the government had in-
formation "materially favorable" to the defense.4
I United States v. Eley, 335 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ga.
1972).
'Id.
3373 U.S. 83 (1963). The Supreme Court held that
requirements of due process prohibit the prosecution
from withholding favorable evidence from an accused
which would tend to exculpate him or reduce punish-
ment.
4 In Williams v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 797, 800 (5th Cir.
1968), cerl. denied, 393 U.S. 1105 (1969), the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held, 'It is now clear
that Brady imposes an affirmative duty on the prose-
cution to produce at the appropriate time requested
evidence which is materially favorable to the accused
either as direct or impeaching evidence."
The "might be helpful" standard had only served
the purpose of requiring the government to bring
to the attention of the defendant the existence of
material which the court might ultimately deter-
mine to be materially favorable.
The court restated the test and eliminated the
"might be helpful" standard. The government
must now respond to an informal request for dis-
covery by stating whether it possesses the informa-
tion and whether the information is "arguably
favorable" to the defendant. If the government
does not possess the information, the inquiry
ends. If the government possesses the information
and finds it materially favorable, it will disclose
it to the defendant. However, if the government
possesses the information but has real doubt as
to whether it is materially favorable, it may deny
the request but must provide a general description
of the information in question. At this point, the
defendant may formally request the court to
examine in camera the arguably favorable informa-
tion. The court then determines whether the
information is materially favorable. 5
In this court, then, the government may not
refuse disclosure of arguably favorable information
without giving the defendant the opportunity to
have the information reviewed by the court for
final determination.
On the precedent of the Fifth Circuit's decision
in United States v. Gonzales,6 which held that the
government has no constitutional duty to assist
the defendant in locating witnesses who have
knowledge of the case, the court here denied the
defendant's request for names and addresses of all
persons known to the government who had knowl-
edge of the facts of the case. While admitting that
the names of such persons might be helpful to the
defendant, the court was unwilling to extend the
scope of discovery in violation of Gonzales. In
response to the defendant's request to copy reports
prepared by the government, the court required
the government to reply to the defendant as to
whether or not it possessed information "arguably
favorable" to the defendant's defense of entrap-
ment.
In United States v. Wright, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir.
6 364 F. Supp. at 442.
6 466 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1972).
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1973), the District of Columbia court of appeals
refused to adopt a common-law rule of discovery
which would require the defense, after its witness
has testified on direct examination, to turn over
to the prosecution prior statements of that witness
in its possession so that those statements could be
used by the government to cross examine the wit-
ness. Such an action, pointed out Judge Wright,
would make fundamental changes in procedures
that have been treated in detail by statute or rule.
The case arose when the prosecution, at trial,
requested the report of the defense investigator
to the defense counsel and later called the investi-
gator as a government rebuttal witness. The court
found it an error to permit the prosecutor to ques-
tion the investigator about his interview with a
defense witness because anything the investigator
said at the trial would be hearsay. As to the
government's claim that the defense should turn
over the investigator's report to the prosecution,
Judge Wright pointed out that this would modify
the Jencks Act,7 making applicable to the defense
what was applicable to the prosecution, a result
not intended by Congress. He also stated that
Rule 16(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedures dealt with the right of discovery by the
government but applied only where the defense
had taken advantage of the right of discovery and
entitled the government only to discover docu-
ments which the defendant intended to produce at
trial. Because the statute and rules were intended
to immunize defense material from discovery,
718 U.S.C. § 3500. This act requires the government
to turn over to the defense prior statements of govern-
ment witnesses after the witness has testified on direct
examination.
8 16 (c) Discovery by the Government. If the court
grants relief sought by the defendant under sub-
division (a) (2) or subdivision (b) of this rule, it
may, upon motion of the government, condition
its order by requiring that the defendant permit
the government to inspect and copy or photograph
scientific or medical reports, books, papers, doc-
uments, tangible objects, or copies or portions
thereof, which the defendant intends to produce
at the trial and which are within his possession,
custody or control, upon a showing of materiality
to the preparation of the government's case and
that request is reasonable. Except as to scientific
or medical reports, this subdivision does not au-
thorize the discovery or inspection of reports,
memoranda, or other internal defense documents
made by the defendant, or his attorneys or agents
in connection with the investigation or defense of
the case or of statements made by the defendant,
or by the government or defense witnesses, or by
prospective government or defense witnesses to
the defendant, his agents or attorneys.
FED. R. CRITh. P. 16.
Judge Wright did not feel that the court should
impose a major change.
Judge Wright also argued that the government's
proposed rule raised a substantial constitutional
question as to its validity under the fifth amend-
ment. The rule would require the defense to turn
over evidence incriminating to the defendant and
entail excessive judicial intrusion into the files
of the defense. The due process clause imposes an
affirmative duty on the government to reveal
evidence helpful to the defense.9 The defense, how-
ever, has no reciprocal duty, a principle long a
part of our legal tradition.10
Judge Wright concluded his opinion by stating:
The defendant has a right under the fifth amend-
ment to compel the state to investigate its own
case, find its own evidence, and prove its own facts.
The defense has no duty to help the prosecution
convict the defendant.n
Police records were the subject of State v. John-
son, 284 So. 2d. 198 (Fla. 1973). The Florida Supreme
Court held that, under restricted circumstances,
the defense can discover police reports and use
them for cross examination and impeachment
purposes. The evidence sought must (1) go to a
critical and material fact in serious contention at
the trial, (2) be reasonably exculpatory of the
defendant, and (3) undergo an in camera review
and deletion.12 The defendant had been convicted
of a breaking and entering charge. At trial the
arresting officer testified that the defendant's coat
on the night of the burglary had on it markings of
white powder similar to a substance found near the
forced entryway. The trial court refused to admit,
for impeachment purposes, the initial police report
that made no mention of powder on the coat. The
court expressed a caution that the use of police
reports should not become a "fishing expedition."
In addition, police reports often contain informa-
tion, such as leads to other cases, that must be
protected. The court added one further limitation
9 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
10 Lord Mansfield once observed:
[I]n civil causes, the Court will force parties to
produce evidence which may prove against them-
selves; or leave the refusal to do it (after proper
notice) as a strong presumption, to the jury....
But in a criminal or penal cause, the defendant is
never forced to produce any evidence; Though
he should hold it in his hands, in Court.
Roe dem. Haldane v. Harvey, 4 Burr. 2489, 98 Eng.
Rep. 302 (K.B. 1769).
1 F.2d at _.
284 So. 2d at 201.
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-that the inquiry should be on a positive state-
ment in a police report, not on an omission.
In Peoplev. Sumpter, 75 Misc. 2d 55,347 N.Y.S.2d
670 (1973), the New York County Supreme Court,
Central Narcotics Division, held that defense
attorneys are entitled, by means of subpoena if
necessary, to examine material in the police de-
partment records which might affect the credibility
of police officers scheduled to testify against their
clients. The court reasoned that since regular
police reports are discoverable when relevant, any
property in the possession of the police department
was subject to discovery, if not exempt. The de-
fendant was entitled to know whether witnesses,
and police officers were no exception, have been
guilty of any acts which may affect their credibil-
ity. Furthermore, the defendant's life is thor-
oughly investigated and may be used to attack
his credibility, and an equal opportunity should be
available to him to obtain data on witnesses
against him. The only factor which might prohibit
disclosure would be the public interest privilege,
under which the government may withhold infor-
mation prejudicial to the public interest, such as
the identity of informants. However, the court
stated that it was in the public interest for the
police department to investigate its police officers,
maintain records and have records available to
those who have a need to know the contents. The
court attached the caveat that the records should
be given to the trial judge for an in camera exami-
nation to determine their relevancy.
A different but related area in the field of dis-
covery involves the prosecution's dossier on jurors.
In People v. Aldrich, 47 Mich. App. 639,209 N.W.2d
796 (1973), the Michigan court of appeals held
that disclosure of the prosecution's dossier on
prospective jurors must be made available to the
defendant on request. The dossier in question was
collected by police agencies and contained informa-
tion both on whether jurors were prosecution-
minded and on jurors' and their families' adverse
contacts with the law.
While courts nation-wide are divided on the
issue of whether information on jurors should be
made available to the defendant, this was a case
of first impression in Michigan. The court, in its
decision, relied on the concept of fundamental
fairness in the area of disclosure." The court found
no rational basis for denying disclosure, which
would treat the defendant unfairly. Because of the
"Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
importance of jurors to the criminal system, non-
disclosure of information on which a defendant
might exercise peremptory challenges would make
justice mere "gamesmanship" in the opinion of the
court. Disclosure of jury dossiers would fulfill an
important function by providing information vital
to the exercise of peremptory challenges and upon
which challenges for cause could be made. 4 The
court disavowed any intention to benefit the de-
fendant. It also disposed of the argument that the
dossiers fall within the "work product" doctrine by
stating that this cannot be invoked to deny dis-
closure of an investigatory report.
SEARcH oF SON'S Room
The Illinois supreme court, in People v. Nunn,
55 Ill. 2d 344, 304 N.E.2d 81 (1973), held that evi-
dence obtained in a warrantless search of a nine-
teen year old's room, carried out at his mother's
request, must be suppressed. Relying on Katz v.
United States,5 the court said that the validity of
this search was to be judged by the reasonable
expectation of privacy. The defendant, prior to
the search, had lived in his mother's home, and,
while he did not pay rent, he did give money inter-
mittently to his mother. The mother had access
to the room. About two weeks before the search,
the defendant moved out, locked the door, and
told his mother not to let anyone into the room.
His mother became concerned and asked the police
to search his room. She gave her written consent
and was present during the search. The police
seized narcotics, hypodermic needles and syringes,
and charged the defendant with the unlawful
possession of them.
Prior Illinois law held that an equal or greater
right to the use or occupancy of premises gives a
co-occupant the right to consent to a search of the
premises. Because Katz was not consistent with
this holding, the court overruled earlier cases. The
Illinois court rejected any consent to the search
based solely on a landlord-tenant relationship or
the property rights of the mother. The critical
issue was whether the son had a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in the locked quarters. The court
found that the defendant did have a reasonable
expectation of privacy after he locked the door and
upon the failure of his mother to object to his re-
quest that she not open the door. Under the Katz
test, the court stated that the critical point was
14 209 N.W.2d at 802.
'r 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
1974)
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whether the son believed his mother would not
enter the locked room or allow others to enter.
The precautions he took indicated his belief that
his room would not be entered. The court then
inquired whether his expectation of privacy was a
reasonable one, and found that it was on the basis
of his mother's actions in setting aside the room
for his use. The court could see no evidence on the
record that the defendant had voluntarily waived
his fourth amendment rights. Finally the court
declared that the police knew that the son had not
given his consent to the room being entered.
Again referring to Katz,"8 the court concluded by
saying that fourth amendment rights protect per-
sons, not areas. Moreover, Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire1 was distinguished. In that case the wife had
voluntarily given her husband's guns and pants
to the police, who had not searched the premises
nor gone there for that purpose. On the other hand,
the sole purpose of the police in Nrnn was to
search the room. Although the mother had re-
quested the search, it was the police who entered
the room. This was dearly government action.
CLAss ACTION
In Wecht v.Marsteller, 363 F. Supp. 1183 (W.D. Pa
1973), victims of unreasonable and brutal conduct
on the part of a Pittsburgh police officer brought a
successful class action suit for injunctive relief in
the federal District Court for Western Pennsyl-
vania. The citizens brought the action under the
Civil Rights Act' on behalf of themselves and on
behalf of all persons who now, have in the past,
16 Id. at 351.
'7403 U.S. 443 (1971).
18 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
or will in the future, travel upon the public roads,
sidewalks and highways of Pittsburgh to enjoin the
police officer from continuing the alleged civil
rights deprivations. The court found that this was
a valid class action under provisions of Rule 23
(b)(2) and (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedurej 9 The court commented that there was
apparently no other existing remedy to protect the
interest involved and that suits for damages were
expensive and ineffective. The major part of the
opinion is the court's finding of facts on the abuses.
Some of the acts which the police officer engaged
in were: arresting without cause a person waiting
for a ride outside a baseball park and forcibly
pushing him against the back of a police cruiser
so that he was in danger of bruising his face on the
vehicle, arresting a man after a verbal confronta-
tion with him at a restaurant and then striking
him with a billy club, and, on two occasions, strk-
ing drivers of cars which he had stopped. At no
time did any of the victims offer any resistance or
threaten any type of bodily injury to the police
officer. On the basis of these facts, the court had
no difficulty in deciding that the police officer had
engaged in illegal and unconstitutional activity by
using physical force and that injunctive relief was
necessary to prevent any further acts on his part.
The court also held that in civil rights matters
state convictions do not constitute collateral
estoppel preventing the plaintiff from attacking
the constitutional question in federal courts.20
19 FED. R. Crv. P. 23.
20 363 F. Supp. at 1190. The court cited Kaufman v.
Moss, U.S. 846 (1970); Ney v. State of California, 439
F.2d 400 1285 (9th Cir. 1971); Mulligan v. Schlachter,
389 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1968); Moran v. Mitchell, 354
F. Supp. 86 (E.D.Va. 1973).
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